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ABSTRACT
The growing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) together with
communication and computer processing technologies are drivers in changing the
paradigm of power system operation and control. The provision of services pro-
vided by DERs requires coordination among many agents, and at many different
levels. One strategy has been to segment existing power systems into microgrids
(MG), which include controllable loads and DERs operated under a single entity.
Since MGs cover a smaller footprint and utilize new control approaches, they are
emerging as an important strategy to advance the resiliency of modern electric
power systems. However, the increasing connectivity of devices for monitoring
and control of MGs serves to also increase the attack surface for a malicious cy-
ber actor. This thesis presents two contributions to this problem. The first is
an explicit characterization of the cyber threats that a MG control system, using
the IEC 61850 standard as its communication architecture, can be susceptible to.
Power system applications can be formally verified through use of object models,
common data classes, and message classes. The IEC 61850-7-420 DER extension
further defines object classes for assets such as types of DERs, DER unit con-
trollers, and other DER-associated devices (e.g., inverters). These object classes
describe asset-specific attributes such as state of charge, capacity limits, and ramp
rate. Attributes can be fixed (rated capacity of the device), dynamic (state of
charge), or binary (on or off, dispatched or off-line, operational or fault state). An
ontology based on the 61850 and 61850-7-420 DER object classes is developed
to model threats against a MG. This thesis considers threats against the measure-
ments on which the control loop is based, as well as attacks against the control
directives and the communication infrastructure. The ontology is used to build
a threat model using the ADversary VIew Security Evaluation (ADVISE) frame-
work, which enables identification of attack paths based on adversary objectives
(for example, destabilize the entire MG by reconnecting to the utility without syn-
chronization) and helps identify defender strategies. The second contribution is
ii
the development of a control and mitigation method for DER integration. A ro-
bust decentralized secondary frequency control design for islanded MGs is devel-
oped to enable resilient coordination and integration of DERs. We cast the control
problem centrally under steady state and adopt the feedback-based Alternating Di-
rection Method of Multipliers (ADMM) algorithm for solving the decentralized
control updates. The ADMM algorithm uses measurements at various points in
the system to solve for control signals. Measurements and control commands are
sent over communication networks such as Ethernet-based local area networks in
the IEC 61850 standard. To enhance the robustness to cyber intrusions, we mod-
ify the ADMM algorithm using the Round-Robin technique to detect malicious
control signals on and from DERs. As a complementary defense, an agreement
algorithm based on fast computation of Kirchhoff’s laws is implemented for con-
tinuously detecting false measurements. The results are demonstrated through
simulation for a representative MG topology.
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Energy resilience and security are paramount to the safety, health, and economic
welfare of peoples across the world. In the United States, the Department of
Homeland Security has designated the energy industry as one of 16 critical in-
frastructure sectors. Presidential Policy Directive 21 identifies the energy sector
as uniquely critical because it provides an “enabling function” across all criti-
cal infrastructure sectors [1]. As part of the energy sector, the electric sector is
responsible for the delivery of reliable power to almost all homes, businesses,
and government entities. This underlies our modern way of life, and measures
to increase the resiliency and security of the electric sector would be a prudent
investment.
At the same time, advancements in information and communication technolo-
gies are serving to transform how the electric power system is monitored and
controlled. The transformation from centralized utility control paradigm to a de-
centralized, user-focused control paradigm is ongoing, and seems to be a lasting
trend.
The introduction of distributed energy resources (DERs) in the form of re-
newable electricity generation or smaller-scale turbines has motivated research
into monitoring and controlling these resources. To bring some clarity to the
blurred lines between traditional utility dispatch and control operations and the
new DERs, the term microgrid (MG) has been utilized. The U.S. Department of
Energy defines a MG as “a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy
resources within clearly defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single control-
lable entity with respect to the grid” [2]. A MG can also connect and disconnect
from the area electric power system to enable it to operate in both grid-connected
or island-mode. MGs are not new; they have been in existence for many years,
e.g., ship power systems, forward operating military bases, and oil and gas plat-
forms.
MGs provide a framework for DER integration, optimization of local power
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systems, ability to serve critical loads, and the intelligence to recover after out-
ages [3]. As MGs have historically served a variety of critical loads, securing
these power systems is imperative. This provides motivation for the MG designer
and operator to be aware of the physical and cyber threats to their system so
that proper communication and control architectures and procedures can be put
in place from the start. To this end, a usable threat model is needed. Threat mod-
eling is a procedure for optimizing network security by identifying objectives and
vulnerabilities. This can then be used as a basis to prevent, or mitigate the effects
of, cyber security threats to a MG. This is where effective control mechanisms are
needed.
MGs and DER integration introduce a number of operational challenges that
need to be addressed in the design of control systems. The MG control system
must be able to ensure the reliable and economic operation, especially in island






• Seamlessly transitioning from grid-connected to islanded mode
This thesis seeks to address the frequency control aspect of a MG control sys-
tem.
1.1 Motivation and Context: Threat Modeling
Threat modeling, conceptually, has been around as long as humans have. Humans,
as they explore new environments, have had to consider what might go wrong
during exploration - lack of water or food, introduction to a predatory species,
or extreme weather conditions. More formally, threat modeling has been used to
prioritize military defense preparations since antiquity. For the remainder of this
section, threat modeling will be considered only as it applies to computing and
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communication systems. We will discuss this generally, as well as with applica-
tion to modern-day power systems.
As described above, threat modeling is a process by which potential threats can
be identified, enumerated, and prioritized - with particular emphasis on a hypo-
thetical attacker’s point of view. The motivation for threat modeling is to provide
system administrators and network architects with a systematic analysis of the var-
ious attacker profiles, the most probable attack vectors, and the goals and assets
most desired by an attacker. Threat modeling, therefore, serves as a foundation
for the specification of security requirements [4].
Threat modeling uses an approach centered on either models of assets, models
of attackers, or models of software [5]. Assets are the critical or valuable resources
within an entity. The people who attempt to gain access, for control or monitor-
ing purposes, are attackers. Attackers primarily gain access through software that
is being built or is already deployed. Different applications will require the se-
curity architect to choose one of these approaches. To aid in the process several
structured approaches to threat modeling have been developed.
One of the most useful modeling techniques is called a data flow diagram,
which breaks down an application or system into its functional components and
indicates the flow of information into and out of the various system components.
This approach is advantageous because it simplifies the identification of threats
because one can follow an attacker’s data and commands as they are processed by
the system. Analysis can be performed on how the data and commands are parsed
and acted upon, as well as noting which assets they interact with. An example of
a data flow diagram is given in [4], where the authors apply the technique to soft-
ware defined radios. A drawback of the data flow diagram is that systems quickly
become too complex to model all the software components and data flows. Other
threat modeling approaches take a higher level approach to overcome this issue.
The STRIDE Threat Model is an approach to threat modeling that was designed
to help people developing software identify the types of attacks that software tends
to experience [6]. The STRIDE acronym stands for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudi-
ation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege. It is
a useful exercise for developers to consider these specific attacks when designing
software. We expand on these threats briefly, using definitions provided in [5].
• Spoofing violates authentication. It does this by pretending to be something
or someone other than the trusted user.
3
• Tampering violates the integrity property by modifying something on disk,
on a network, on in memory.
• Repudiation violates non-repudiation by claiming that you did not do some-
thing, or were not responsible.
• Information disclosure violates confidentiality by providing information to
someone not authorized to see it.
• Denial of service violates availability by absorbing resources needed to pro-
vide the original service.
• Elevation of privilege violates authorization by allowing someone to exe-
cute something they are not authorized to do.
There appear to be no public uses of the STRIDE threat modeling methodology
for electric power systems. [7] examines threat and risk assessment techniques,
including STRIDE, for the automotive domain, and uses this to determine appro-
priate countermeasures to be considered. [8] presents a quantitative, integrated
threat modeling approach that merges software and attack centric threat modeling
techniques, including STRIDE, and applies it to a case study of a railway commu-
nication network. While not electric power sector specific, these still incorporate
threat modeling for safety-critical domains.
Another methodology for threat modeling involves the development of attack
trees. Attack trees provide a formal, methodical way of describing security of
systems, constructed from a multitude of possible attacks. This analysis provides
a succinct representation of all paths through a system that end in a state where an
intruder has successfully achieved their goal.
Once the system under study has been modeled, an attack tree is used to analyze
its security. The attack elicitation task is to iterate over each node in the tree and
consider if that issue impacts the system [9]. However, generating attack trees
is potentially cumbersome, as there can be an exhaustive list of potential attacks.
To aid with this, ranking schemes are useful [10]. There has been significant
research into developing automated attack tree tools. In [11], the authors present
an example to illustrate how to specify and analyze network attack models, and
how they are used as inputs to an automated tool. A more complete treatment of
attack tree techniques is given in [12].
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There have been some examples of the attack tree methodology being applied
to power systems. [13] developed an attack tree-based methodology for impact
analysis for the electric sector. The attack tree formulated based on power system
control networks is used to evaluate system-, scenario-, and leaf-level vulnerabili-
ties by identifying the system’s adversary objectives. In [14], attack trees are used
to assess vulnerabilities in SCADA systems based on Modbus and Modbus/TCP
communication protocols. The purpose of this assessment was to calculate the
characteristics of the topmost attack event and to identify possible ways to achieve
the final goal of the attack. [15] provides a useful review of general cyber security
risk assessment methods for SCADA systems.
1.2 Motivation and Context: Microgrid Control
This thesis seeks to address the secondary frequency control aspect of a MG con-
trol system, and the remainder of this section will give an overview of the literature
on this particular aspect. [16] treats the broader trends in MG control including all
aspects of the MG control system.
Grid modernization envisions the adoption of information and communication
technologies in the electrical power system for measurement, state estimation, and
control [17]. This enables the increasing penetration of DERs in MGs, defined as
a collection of controllable loads, DERs, and controls to maintain stability and
serve loads. Some MGs, such as those for some military applications and remote
community installations, are designed to operate without connection to an area
electric power system (AEPS), typically a utility distribution network. Other MGs
connect to an AEPS through a point of interconnection (POI), and can operate
connected to the AEPS or in stand-alone (island) mode.
When connected to the AEPS, frequency regulation is provided by rotational
inertia from legacy generation in the AEPS. The DERs can be operated in PQ
control mode. A PQ controlled inverter operates by injecting the power available
at its input into the AEPS. The reactive power injected corresponds to some pre-
specified value, defined either locally (say, to maintain constant power factor) or
centrally from the microgrid controller (MGC). PQ mode of operation is possible
because the AEPS provides a voltage and frequency reference.
In island mode, frequency regulation is a challenge because many DERs in-
herently have no rotational inertia. Thus, maintaining MG stability is the critical
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concern when inertia-less DERs, such as solar photovoltaic (PV) and a variety
of battery and storage systems, are integrated in a network. Additionally, cou-
pling DERs to the grid involves fast-acting power electronics inverters, requiring
sophisticated embedded controllers for each resource [18]. Accordingly, accu-
rate measurements at high sampling rates as well as control commands must be
reliably delivered and trusted.
A frequency regulation architecture for MGs must be designed to ensure that
stable operation results and that the frequency at every bus in the system is equal
to the desired reference value. The frequency regulation architecture for AEPS
has typically depended on a centralized control concept, called Automatic Gen-
eration Control (AGC) [19], and MGs offer the opportunity to rethink the control
architecture. Control strategies ranging from centralized to completely distributed
have been proposed to address frequency regulation.
To this end, the hierarchical control of DERs has recently been adopted as a
standard operational paradigm for islanded MGs [20,21]. The conventional droop
control design, along with the faster inner voltage and current control loops, is im-
plemented at the primary level. Such autonomous local droop control design aims
to stabilize the system frequency and voltage under random disturbances while
ensuring power sharing among DERs that is proportional to the rated capacity of
the DERs [22]. Centralized architectures have been used for primary control [23],
but in order to enable plug-and-play capability, using proportional control loops
locally at each inverter is the current standard. While these distributed primary
droop controllers are successful in stabilizing the system frequency, they may lead
to steady state mismatches from nominal frequency and bus voltages [24].
Meanwhile, the secondary control design, enabled by the communication net-
work, coordinates the system-wide information regarding the status of DERs to
further minimize the mismatch error from the primary level. Centralized tech-
niques for secondary control are well documented for AEPS, and thus have been
extended to MGs. However, due to single-point-of-failure and communication
network constraints associated with centralized design, recent research on decen-
tralized secondary control techniques has received widespread attention [25, 26].
The final level of tertiary control is responsible for optimizing long-term de-
cisions based on system states, market signals, and demand forecasts. It is con-
cerned with global economic dispatch over the full network and depends on cur-
rent energy markets and prices. Next, we discuss some of the relevant work that
has been presented in the literature on secondary frequency regulation.
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Centralized approaches to MG control have been proposed in [24, 27, 28]. [27]
presents an overall control scheme for islanded MGs including reactive power
sharing, while [28] presents strategies for optimizing the production of local DERs
and power exchanges with the AEPS through a central MGC. While these schemes
propose control architectures for frequency regulation with power electronics-
interfaced DERs, they do not provide analytical results guaranteeing both stability
and system-wide operation at the desired frequency.
To reduce communication requirements and to increase the interoperability of
DERs, recent work has developed several distributed secondary control designs
using node to node communication of the DERs without any central supervi-
sor. Distributed approaches have been proposed in [29–31]. [31] analytically
shows frequency regulation to be stable; however, it relies on a linearized network
model. [29] analytically shows frequency regulation to be stable and establishes
convergence of its consensus algorithms. [30] proposes a distributed dual-ascent
based update for secondary frequency control while achieving active power shar-
ing.
Finally, [21] proposes a hierarchical control architecture that shows the min-
imizer of the economic dispatch problem is in one-to-one correspondence with
the set of steady states reachable by droop control; however their analyis is only
local and is restricted to acyclic networks. [20] proposes a control architecture
motivated by coupled oscillator theory to provide a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the existence of a synchronized solution that is unique, but only locally
exponentially stable.
1.3 Thesis Contributions and Outline
This thesis aims to develop a usable threat model to inform parties interested in
installing MGs - utilities, electric cooperatives, military organizations, university
campuses, and communities seeking increased energy resilience. An ontology is
built from object models from the Common Information Model (CIM) and IEC
61850 standards. This ontology serves to describe components within a MG con-
trol system, and the attributes of the components and relationships among them.
No such ontology currently exists for MG control systems. The ontology is then
used by the ADVISE methodology to generate potential attack paths within a MG
control system. The generic modeling of the ontology and ADVISE allow for
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system integrators to customize the threat model to their specific MG installation
topology. A reference topology is developed, and specific instances of attack paths
are generated. Another purpose of this thesis is to give explicit characterization of
attack paths so that other researchers may attempt their own mitigation strategies.
Another contribution of this thesis is the development of complementary de-
fense strategies against these attacks by leveraging the communication capabili-
ties under the IEC 61850 standard [32]. To enhance the robustness to malicious
control command attacks, we employ the Round-Robin (RR) technique at the cen-
tral supervisor for generating the consensus variable based on the ADMM algo-
rithm [33]. Interestingly, by tracking the evolution of this RR-based variable, we
are able to effectively identify compromised DER controllers. As for the mea-
surement attack, we adopt a complementary defense based on an Agreement Al-
gorithm (AA) to detect and locate false measurements on which the secondary
control is based [34]. It should be noted that these two approaches give visibility
into where the attack is happening. Thus, this can not only enable appropriate
response with the correct mitigation, but can alert an operator to the specific root
cause. Together with the RR and AA detection algorithms, the central supervisor
would be able to either isolate the malicious communication links from control up-
dates or trip the malicious DERs off-line. This provides a multi-pronged approach
to resilient and efficient MG operation in the face of adversarial conditions. These
algorithms are validated and demonstrated through simulation analysis of several
use cases of interest.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the
reference MG topology, communication and control architecture, and attack sce-
narios to be mitigated. The reference MG topology is used to derive usable threat
models. The IEC 61850 standard motivates the control architecture given that it
is based on TCP/IP over Ethernet. Attack scenarios are given narrative to moti-
vate the attack detection mechanisms. Chapter 3 presents a comprehensive cyber
security threat model for the multi-MG power system. This threat model is based
on an ontology that is informed by industry standard object models. Attack exe-
cution graphs are carried out for a subset of critical threats for MGs. Chapter 4
introduces the droop control characteristic for islanded MGs while formulating the
steady state consensus problem for the secondary control design. The decentral-
ized frequency control design is solved by adopting the ADMM updates with the
instantaneous power measurement feedback approach. Detection mechanisms are
derived and mitigation strategies for the attack scenarios are proposed. Numerical
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results are presented to validate the analytical claims. Concluding remarks and





This chapter serves to introduce the operating conditions of the multi-MG sys-
tem. The threat modeling in Chapter 3 will be built using this topology, while
the control algorithms in Chapter 4 will be developed for the general case. Ex-
plicit characterization of the multi-MG system is useful for the reader to follow
along with. The characterization will include the power system topology, control
architecture and devices, and communication protocol used.
2.1 Multi-microgrid Topology
The multi-MG system can be seen in Figure 2.1. Each MG is fed from a different
incoming substation that steps down a 69 kV feeder circuit to 12 kV for the MG
buses. The salient feature of this system is that each MG is operated by a different
entity. The MGs are interconnected with each other by two normally open (N.O.)
circuit breakers, one that connects the main MG buses and another that connects
the critical load buses.
Each MG has a variety of DERs, including both synchronous generators and
power electronic-interfaced DERs. The synchronous generators in the system are
natural gas and diesel generators. Diesel generators are capable of ramping up
quickly, on the order of 5-10 seconds, so they are used to power critical loads if
the utility distribution system goes down. Natural gas generators do not respond as
fast as diesel gensets, but natural gas is becoming more economically competitive
than diesel, as well as having lower greenhouse gas emissions, which has led to an
increasing number of natural gas generators being used in MGs. The other DERs
are solar photovoltaic (PV) and battery energy storage systems (ESS). Solar PV is
an intermittent renewable energy source, and it typically operates in a maximum
power point tracking mode. The ESS is able to charge, discharge, or possibly























MG2 Owner: PrivateMG1 Owner: Utility
Figure 2.1: The reference multi-MG topology considered for the threat modeling.
used as a backup power source, while the ESS on microgrid 2 (MG2) is able to
participate according to the discretion of the MG operator and controller. The
DERs are indicative of a typical MG, but are not derived specifically from any
existing MG installation.
The multi-MG system is interesting for a variety of reasons. This topology is
considered for two particular reasons: cyber security implications of the various
entities controlling the MGs, and collaborative power sharing when the utility
distribution system goes down. The former will be discussed later in trying to
answer the question “Does the cyber security posture of one of the entities affect
the other?” The latter scenario is discussed briefly here.
Utility distribution systems can be taken offline for a variety of reasons: adverse
weather conditions, non-malicious critters crawling around in substations, and
vegetation overgrowth, among others. When this occurs, the MGs are able to
disconnect from the utility system and to keep powering load with its own DERs.
One situation considered is when an outage extends for a lengthy period of time,
and the operators decide to operate the MGs in a degraded state where only critical
load is served. The operators for each respective MG may decide that they can best
maximize the fuel storage (either in the form of state of charge of the batteries
or natural gas and diesel fuel) by cooperatively sharing DERs among both MGs’
critical loads. In doing so, an agreement on how and when to close the N.O. circuit
breaker for the critical load buses needs to be determined. Here, it is proposed that
the utility-controlled MG has the ultimate control of the tie breakers. The rationale
for this is that a utility would be hesitant to allow another entity to backfeed a large
amount of power back into the grid. This would be due to safety concerns of the
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restoration crews.
The MGs may also determine that they have enough DERs and fuel to support
both the critical and non-critical loads, again if DERs are shared among the MGs.
This would necessitate an agreement about when and how to close the tie breaker
connecting the main MG buses. Again, it is proposed that the utility-controlled
MG has the ability to control this breaker. MG2 has the ability to send a request
to MG1 to close the breaker, but the MG1 operator and controller has ultimate
authority on whether or not to close the breaker.
2.2 Communication Protocol: IEC 61850 and CIM
The IEC standard 61850 was introduced as a standard for substation automation
systems, with the aim to standardize communications and enable interoperabil-
ity of IEDs. While IEC 61850 provides a comprehensive information model of
substation automation components, it is also useful for the modeling of MG com-
ponents. Many of the components overlap between the substation automation
and MG domains, and IEC working groups are extending the standard to cover
functions outside of substation automation. One such extension is IEC standard
61850-7-420 for DERs [35]. The comprehensive information models of the base
standard and its extensions are utilized in the context of a MG.
IEC 61850 provides a standard for configuring Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IEDs) for electrical substation automation systems to be able to communicate
with each other. IEC 61850 also includes a number of message classes. For the
purposes of this thesis, the pertinent ones are Sampled Values (SV), by which dig-
itized system measurements are communicated to merging units at the rate of 80
values per grid cycle (60 Hz in the U.S., resulting in an SV with a rate of 4800
Hz), and Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE), which are used to
communicate status values (breaker open or closed) as well as commands to trip
a breaker or to block a trip from taking place. Sampled Values transmit digitized
measurements of voltage and current from a merging unit to an IED. A merging
unit is an interface unit that accepts multiple analog current and voltage wave-
forms from current transformers (CTs) and potential transformers (PTs), and pro-
duces digital, time-synchronized outputs to provide information via an Ethernet
bus. GOOSE messages containing status, data, and control commands can be sent
from one IED to another. Both of these protocols run over TCP/IP networks using
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high speed switched Ethernet. IEC 61850 incorporates concepts of a process bus,
over which measurements are communicated, and a station bus, where control and
configuration commands are sent. See Figure 2.2 for an example IEC 61850 envi-
ronment. Since this standard uses Ethernet, the ability for IEDs to communicate
with a centralized controller exists. Accordingly, the communication architecture
from IEC 61850 is used as motivation for the decentralized control architecture
presented in Chapter 4.
2.3 Control and Communication Architecture
This section serves to better detail the control and communication architectures
that are considered in this thesis. As discussed in Section 2.2, IEC 61850 uses
Ethernet for its communication medium. This allows for multicasting of GOOSE
and SV messages between devices connected to the communication network. This
can be thought of as a fully-connected graph. A decentralized control architecture
is proposed for secondary control and attack detection mechanisms. This will be
detailed in Chapter 4; however, the architecture is presented here. A central MGC
will make a consensus calculation, and each local DER controller will compute a
closed-form optimal solution to its own local problem. The DER controller will
then send a new power injection command to its local DER based on the adjusted
real power-frequency droop curve. Figure 2.3 shows the control architecture.
The communication network and associated IEDs of the reference MG topology
are shown in Figure 2.4. The two MG communication networks are segmented
since they are operated by different entities. However, since both are within close
physical proximity, they interact with the same distribution management system
(DMS). The relays, MGC, and DER controllers for each MG lie on the same Eth-
ernet bus. The relays for each substation are on a separate Ethernet bus from its
corresponding MG bus. The tie breaker relays are connected to the MG1 commu-
nication network since it is utility operated. The MGCs are able to communicate
over an internet connection to facilitate real power exchanges and emergency sup-
port.
13






















































































































































































































Figure 2.4: Communication architecture for the reference multi-MG system.
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2.4 Attack Scenarios
Emerging MGs include a central MGC which communicates with individual DER
controllers. Measurements and commands travel over communication networks,
as given by IEC 61850. This communication structure potentially exposes the
system to cyber attack, which can assume the form of invalid commands (which
can cause a DER to perform potentially destabilizing power injections) as well
as falsified measurements (which can lead even a correctly functioning MGC to
issue erroneous control commands).
2.4.1 Local Measurement Attack
In the IEC 61850 architecture, the communication bus that transmits digitized
measurements from a merging unit to any subscribing IED is denoted as the pro-
cess bus. Here, it is assumed that the attacker has access either locally to the
merging unit, or to the Ethernet-based process bus. The DER controller that sub-
scribes to the measurement messages would thus calculate incorrect power injec-
tion commands. This could drive the MG to an unstable state. It is assumed that
the attack is large enough to cause a reasonable frequency disturbance within the
MG. A local merging unit or controller attack may result in the tripping of the
DER, while a communication link attack results in reconfiguring the control algo-
rithm to exclude the malicious DER. An alternative approach to defending against
a measurement attack would be to explore fast state estimation within the MG to
compute what the correct voltages and/or currents should be.
2.4.2 Communication Link Attack on Control Command
The second scenario considered is a communication link attack on the control
command, potentially via the IEC 61850 station bus, which is used to send control
commands to IEDs. In our setup, it is used to exchange ADMM-related variables.
This is not the same as an attack on the local DER controller itself. The attack
would result in the MGC calculating the wrong consensus variable, which would
thus send the MG to an off-nominal frequency setpoint. The attack detection
mechanism examines the consensus variable and monitors for any rapid changes
that exceed a threshold. If one is found, the mechanism looks for the errant local
DER controller update and then sets that DER to local droop control. The system
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should then converge to a steady state with the remaining DERs participating in
the secondary frequency control while the spoofed DER operates in local droop
mode only.
2.4.3 Local DER Controller Attack on Control Command
The final scenario again considers a control command attack. However, here the
attack is on the local DER controller. An attacker compromises the DER con-
troller by some mechanism. This causes the system frequency and consensus
variable to start to diverge. The attack detection again relies on monitoring the
consensus variable and when it detects which DER is malicious, it again sets the
malicious DER to local control mode, because at this point it is not yet known if it
is a communication link or local controller attack. If after a short time period after
setting the malicious DER to local droop mode the system frequency and consen-
sus variable are still divergent, the MGC then determines this must be a local DER
controller attack and issues a trip signal to the relay connecting the DER unit to
the MG.
2.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has introduced several key components to be analyzed in the follow-
ing chapters. A reference multi-MG topology was defined which will facilitate
explicit characterization of cyber threats. IEC 61850 was introduced and context
was given as to how this communication standard helps define the control and
communication architecture herein. The control and communication architectures
were detailed to set up the threat modeling. Finally, example attack scenarios were




This chapter will introduce a comprehensive cyber security threat model for a
multi-MG power system. The threat modeling is informed by an ontology built
using the CIM and IEC 61850 object models. Example attack executions are
carried out using the Adversary View Security Evaluation (ADVISE) tool and
methodology. This chapter also details cyber attacks following the format of the
Electric Sector Failure Scenarios and Impact Analyses [36] resulting from the
National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource (NESCOR) project
hereafter referred to as the NESCOR failure scenarios.
3.1 Microgrid Ontology Development
As defined in [37], in the context of information sciences, an ontology defines a
set of representational primitives with which to model a domain of knowledge.
The representational primitives typically include information about their meaning
and constraints on their logically consistent application.
The core CIM is maintained as a Unified Modeling Language (UML) model.
It defines the components of a power system as classes and defines three relation-
ships between the classes: inheritance, association, and aggregation. The param-
eters within each class are also defined. This provides a foundation for a generic
model that can represent all aspects of a power system.
Harmonization of the CIM and 61850 is being addressed by IEC Working
Group 19 and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) [38]. This ontol-
ogy is based upon the CIM physical model, as it is an information model, and
the IEC 61850 standard is utilized for its communication, control, and monitoring
functions. These will be layered on top of the CIM physical model. The ontol-
ogy definition is not exhaustive; however, this thesis serves to define the building
blocks of the MG ontology, and then describe specific attack scenarios within the
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MG control system. The MG ontology does not currently spell out specific cy-
ber components, such as firewalls, HMIs, etc. This class of components is being
considered by IEC technical committees. The ADVISE model, detailed in Section
3.2.1, is able to represent these components and the base ADVISE ontology begins
to express fundamental ancestor types, such as Server, Firewall, and Network.
Classes in CIM are grouped together into packages dependent on their role
within the power system. The core standard contains eight main packages plus
a global domain package that defines data types. The Core, Wires, and Topology
packages contain all the basic classes for defining the physical characteristics of
a power network. The Core package contains the parent PowerSystemResource
(PSR) class, from which all other classes concerned with the physical properties of
the network inherit. In addition, there are Generation, LoadModel, Measurement,
Outage, and Protection packages.
The IdentifiedObject class is the root class for this particular branch of the CIM
class hierarchy, and key CIM classes in this reference MG hierarchy are:
• PowerSystemResource, used to describe any resource within the power sys-
tem, whether it is a physical piece of equipment or an organizational entity
such as ControlArea.
• Equipment, which refers to any piece of the power system that is a physical
device, whether it be electrical or mechanical.
• ConductingEquipment, used to define types of Equipment that are designed
to carry current or that are conductively connected to the network.
The current transformer (CT) class is used to measure current on an electrical
conductor, but does not map to a piece of ConductingEquipment in the CIM. In-
stead, a Measurement instance, representing a SCADA measurement from the CT,
is associated with the Terminal on the Breaker. The AsynchronousMachine class
maps to a single piece of conducting equipment, as shown in Figure 3.1. When op-
erating as a generator, the AsynchronousMachine object must have an association
with an instance of GeneratingUnit. For the reference MG, the AsynchronousMa-
chine will be the battery storage. Another class is the SynchronousMachine class,
and this would contain diesel and natural gas generators.
IEC 61850 provides a comprehensive library of semantic models known as log-
ical nodes (LN), although there is a lack of concrete semantic information attached
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Figure 3.1: High-level representation of CIM base ontology that relates to the
reference MG.
to the LNs. However, relations between two logical nodes can be defined from a
particular context. Therefore, this work extends the IEC 61850 ontology to pro-
vide such contextual information, which defines logical relations between logical
nodes within a MG. In addition, the IEC 61850-7-420 DER extension standard
is utilized to include logical nodes that are related to DERs. As an example, the
MMXU measurement logical node will be used by the MG controller to make a
decision regarding resynchronization of the POI breaker, which uses the logical
node XCBR.
To augment the CIM model with IEC 61850, LNs are related to PSRs by defin-
ing a relationship between the MG functions and the PSR that is providing the
requested function. The IEC 61850 Logical Node Groups are used to define the
functions in this ontology. Those groups are listed in Table 1 of the IEC 61850-7-4
standard. The list below enumerates the logical node groups that are most appli-
cable in the MG context. These groups contain specific LNs that control systems
within a MG would need to utilize.
• Automatic and supervisory control.
• Distributed energy resources.
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• Metering and measurement.
• Protection functions.
• Instrument transformer and sensors.
Next, the CIM SCADA class and PSR are expanded to include intelligent elec-
tronic devices of the types Relay, Microgrid Controller, and Battery Controller.
The MGC makes dispatch decisions for all the resources within the MG, and re-
sponds to requests from the utility distribution management system (DMS). The
battery controller can receive commands from the MGC, as well as make deci-
sions based upon local measurements. A relay controls circuit breakers which
determine which electrical connections are open and closed. Figure 3.2 shows
how the IEDs are introduced into the CIM base ontology, and a small subset of
LN connections are shown in red to detail where the IEDs are monitoring and
controlling within the reference MG.
The LNClass allows the specification of a 61850 function for a particular do-
main. For example, the 61850 DER extension introduces a LN class called DER
Unit Controller LNs. The DER device controller defines the operational char-
acteristics of a single DER device. These characteristics can be either fixed or
dynamic attributes. Example LNs within this class include DER Supervisory Con-
trol (DRCC) and DER Unit Generator (DGEN). DRCC has, among others, a fixed
attribute of maximum real and reactive power the generator can output. DGEN
has, among others, a dynamic attribute of “generator is synchronized to the EPS.”
These and other LNs allow the controllers within in a MG to correctly operate the
system to maintain stable voltage and frequency. Figure 3.3 shows the interaction
of the MGC with other PSRs, and some example LNs are shown in red. Here only
one MG is shown to simplify redundant interactions that would occur on each
MG.
The MG instance diagram is shown in Figure 3.4, and the ontology class in-
heritance tree is shown in Figure 3.5. This ontology will be used as an input to
the ADVISE model. To further motivate the creation of an ADVISE model, we
briefly describe an example cyber attack within a MG. A destructive attack is to
cause the MG to connect to the utility when the two systems are not tightly aligned
in voltage, frequency, and phase angle. A MG that has operated in island mode for
a time may be at nominal frequency and voltage, but not aligned in phase angle
with the utility. The MGC issues power injection commands to the assets within
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Figure 3.2: Introducing DER and MG control systems into the reference
ontology, and mapping to the corresponding LNs (red).
Figure 3.3: Relationships between IEDs and the associated LNs within a
single-entity MG.
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its control to align its phase angle to that of the utility according to IEEE Std.
1547 [39]. The control commands are based on measurements that come from the
MMXU logical nodes, and in actual operation are reported at merging units. The
attack assumes that an adversary can inject false measurements into a merging
unit or on the process bus. We next describe how an ADVISE model built from
this ontology can be used to model this attack.
3.2 ADVISE Model and Attack Executions
The MG ontology introduced is intended to be used for the construction of AD-
VISE models, with the ultimate purpose of evaluating the cyber-physical security
ramifications of various design decisions. A brief overview of ADVISE is given,
and it is discussed how the MG ontology can be used to generate useful ADVISE
models.
3.2.1 Overview of ADVISE Formalism
ADVISE models [40] define an attack execution graph (AEG) that formally ex-
presses the potential attack paths of an adversary attacking the system. Within
the AEG, the state of an adversary’s progress is stored in several types of state
variables:
• Access elements define access domains.
• Knowledge elements define items of information.
• Skill elements define abilities.
• Goal elements define objectives.
The values of these state variables identify what the adversary possesses at a
given time. Access, knowledge, and goals are Boolean, with TRUE indicating
that the adversary has obtained the item. Skills are integers between 0 and 1000,
with greater numbers indicating a greater proficiency. Additionally, there is a
System State Variable element type, which defines state variables not tied to the
adversary, e.g., the frequency of the MG bus. System state variables may be
integers, Booleans, floats, or character types. Figure 3.6 shows the elements of












































































































































































































Figure 3.4: The system instance diagram used to generate all ADVISE models for the multi-MG topology.
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Figure 3.5: The ontology class inheritance tree showing the base and MG ontology packages.
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Figure 3.6: Elements of ADVISE models and their relationships.
Figure 3.7 shows a fragment of the attack execution graph based on the ref-
erence MG. Incoming arcs to an attack step mean that the state variable is used
by the precondition expression of the attack step and outgoing arcs mean that the
value of the state variable may be altered by an outcome of the attack step be-
ing attempted. When these attack steps are chained together, they form the attack
paths possible in the model.
An ADVISE model also contains an adversary profile, which describes an ad-
versary’s interest or aversion to cost, detection, and payoff, as well as an adver-
sary’s initial state (state variables in the AEG he possesses at the beginning of
simulation), and how many steps into the future an adversary can consider when
planning his attack.
Using discrete-event simulation, custom quantitative metrics about the system
performance, adversary behavior, operator costs, and more can be estimated. The
quantitative results gathered in this way should not be used as absolute measures,
since model input parameters may be inaccurate, but results can be used to make
relative comparisons and sensitivity analysis can help users understand the effect
of input parameters.
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Figure 3.7: Relationships between IEDs and the associated LNs within the
reference MG.
3.2.2 ADVISE Model Generation
Realistic ADVISE models can grow large quickly, require a wide array of input
parameters, and be too complex for manual construction. To alleviate these prob-
lems, the ADVISE Meta Modeling [41] approach has been developed. ADVISE
Meta uses an ontology containing
1. A set of component types
2. A set of relationship types
3. A set of AEG fragments
4. A set of rules linking component and relationship instances to AEG frag-
ment instances
Using Sets 1 and 2 from the ontology, the user constructs a meta model. An
ADVISE Meta Model contains a high-level block-diagram of the system to be
studied. The system diagram is composed of component instances as nodes and
relationship instances as arcs between two nodes. The ADVISE Meta generator
then applies the rules in Set 4 to generate and connect instances of AEG fragments
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Figure 3.8: The relationships between different parts of the ADVISE model
generation process.
from Set 3. This results in a complete ADVISE model of the system. Figure 3.8
shows the connections among the different pieces of the ADVISE model genera-
tion workflow.
For space reasons, the Figure 3.7 omits many more incoming and outgoing arcs
from all of the elements in the diagram. In this fragment, the adversary may gain
access to the utility’s HMI, including the MG and utility measurements accessible
by the HMI, by using remote desktop to access it remotely or by gaining physical
access to the HMI. Once the adversary has access to the HMI, if the service phase
angles (from the MMXU LN) of the MG and the utility buses are out of sync, the
adversary can launch a spoofing attack that will fool the POI breaker into closing
in an unsafe state and potentially damaging equipment, such as the natural gas
generator. Another consequence of such an attack can be the loss of service to a
critical load.
The effect of attempting any attack step in an AEG is stochastic, so it is not
guaranteed that the adversary will be successful in obtaining their goal. For the
Spoof Phase Angle Measurements to Trigger Async. Close of POI attack step,
the outcome that gets selected during simulation depends on the magnitude of the
difference of the MG and utility phase angles. IEEE 1547 specifies that the POI
may close if the MG and utility are within 10◦ in phase angle. The adversary may
spoof measurements so as to indicate that this condition is met, thereby enabling
a potentially damaging POI close. If the true phase angle difference is within this
limit, the spoofed measurement attack may result in a decision to close the POI,
but otherwise does no harm to equipment. However, if the difference of phase
angles is significant (> 25◦), then the adversary has a 90% chance of damaging
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the natural gas generator as well as opening the relay that protects the energy
storage system. This also results in the critical load not being served. For this
hypothetical attack step, there is always a 10% chance that the adversary will fail
to achieve anything.
3.3 Generic Control System Threat Scenarios
Before enumerating specific attack scenarios, the different classes of attacks that
can occur in a MG control system are categorized in a generic way. The classi-
fication is motivated by considering a classical closed-loop control system. The
classes are then extended to the MG control system.
Figure 3.9 shows an example closed-loop control system where a process is
monitored via a sensor that then reports measurements to a controller. The con-
troller then executes its internal logic and sends commands to an actuator which
executes these commands onto the process. In consideration of this example sys-
tem, it becomes evident that the following classes of attacks are possible:
• Sensor attack: This attack can occur because an adversary gains access to
the sensor device or because it sends in environmental signals that cause the
sensor to misreport values, e.g., acoustic spoofing of an accelerometer.
• Controller attack: This attack can occur because an adversary gains ac-
cess to a controller, e.g., diesel gensets and their controllers are commonly
housed on campuses with only a simple lock to maintain physical security.
• Actuator attack: This attack can occur because an adversary gains phys-
ical or remote access to an actuator, e.g., manual or remote actuation of a
breaker.
• Process attack: This attack can occur because an adversary causes explicit
damage to the system under control, e.g., shooting a transformer.
• Communication network attack: This attack can be viewed as either a
sort of man-in-the-middle attack between the sensor and controller or the
controller and actuator or a denial of service attack on the measurement or
control signals.
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Here sensor, controller, and actuator attacks (which can be viewed as device
attacks) are distinguished from communication network attacks. This may be
somewhat arbitrary, but in doing so it allows for the evaluation of communication
network architecture design choices, which would not be the case if the commu-
nication network attacks were lumped in with the device attacks. Process attacks
are predominantly physical attacks, and so are deemed outside the scope of this
thesis. Using this mapping, cyber threats are categorized to the MG system in
following general two categories:
• Attacks on a device
• Attacks on a communication link
Figure 3.10 shows the mapping of the MG control system components to the
generic control system classes identified above. Following the classification of
attacks, specific scenarios for the MG control system will be given. All of the
attack scenarios incorporate more than one class of components, so a strict cat-
egorization is not possible. However, the core component for that compromise
is identified and then used to discern which attack class the scenario should fall
under.
In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, the notation and format of the NESCOR failure scenar-
ios is adopted. These failure scenarios are commonly used within the US electric
utility industry for threat modeling. This framework is extended to the MG set-
ting to allow for explicit threat characterization of the multi-MG system. To the
author’s knowledge, such a detailed analysis does not exist in the literature.
3.4 Device-specific Threat Scenarios
3.4.1 Scenario 1: Malicious Modification of Power Set Point
Commands on the Local DER Controller
Description: Many DERs reside in physically unsecured locations, e.g., a diesel
generator sits outside an academic building. A threat agent could gain access by
picking the lock and maliciously changing parameters of the genset controller.
One such parameter could be the local droop curve setpoint, and we develop a
detection and mitigation strategy in the next chapter. Alternately, a threat agent
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Figure 3.9: Closed-loop control system.
Figure 3.10: Instances of the MG control system.
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has been performing reconnaissance on the MG, and determines that a critical
load has an ESS for backup power. The threat agent then attempts to gain access
to the ESS controller, either physically or remotely, and then discharges the ESS
completely in advance of tripping the critical load bus off from the MG.
Relevant Vulnerabilities:
• System permits messages to be modified by unauthorized individuals
• Message modified by an adversary is either difficult or infeasible to distin-
guish from a valid message
Impact:
• The DER system may sustain damage due to trying to act on invalid mes-
sages
• The MG may experience frequency instability
• Underutilization of DER’s power output capability during an islanding sce-
nario
Potential Mitigations:
• Authenticate messages in all communication protocols
• Validate data in DER system messages as reasonable and within DER in-
trinsic capabilities
3.4.2 Scenario 2: Malicious Modification of the Protection
Settings in Protective Relays
Description: The threat agent may gain remote access to the protective relay and
can then modify trip settings, such as time overcurrent curves, or disable standard
ANSI protection functions. Alternately, an adversary could send MMS messages
containing protection reconfiguration to the protective relays.
Relevant Vulnerabilities:
• Unnecessary access is permitted to system functions via engineering and
console ports of the MGC
• Physical access may be obtained by unauthorized individuals
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• System permits messages to be modified by unauthorized individuals
• Message modified by an adversary is either difficult or infeasible to distin-
guish from a valid message
Impact:
• Possible loss of customer due to false operation of protective devices
• Possible damage to power system equipment if exposed to overcurrents and
overvoltages due to no operation of protective devices
Potential Mitigations:
• Restrict remote access to protective relays
• Use Role-Based Access Control to limit access to software files on the pro-
tective relays
3.4.3 Scenario 3: Malicious Auto-reclose Command to Circuit
Breakers from the Protective Relays
Description: The threat agent gains access to the MGC through the utility DMS
or other means, and causes the MG to island. When the utility DMS or the MGC
requests reconnection, the threat agent spoofs measurements to the synchronizing
breaker, while simultaneously commanding the MG generator so that the MG
gradually moves to be out of phase with the utility grid. In particular, the threat
agent acquires access to the voltage and angle measurements on both sides of the
POI. They may wait until the systems are sufficiently out of phase to cause the
POI breaker to close for maximum damage to the generator. During this process,
they drive the MG out of phase by sending control commands to the generator
DER controller.
Relevant Vulnerabilities:
• Unnecessary access is permitted to system functions via engineering and
console ports of the MGC
• Physical access may be obtained by unauthorized individuals
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Impact:
• Potential damage to synchronous machines connected to the MG
• Possible loss of customer due to tripping off of DERs
Potential Mitigations:
• Restrict access to engineering functions
• Maintain patches for protective relays
• Authenticate users for access to engineer and console ports where feasible
3.5 Communication Link-specific Threat Scenarios
3.5.1 Scenario 1: Malicious Modification of Droop Curve
Settings for DERs via the Station Bus
Description: The adversary can use MMS discovery services to scan for the DER
controller IP addresses, identify control models and data objects supported by the
DER and change the setpoints of DER controllers and/or trip the devices. One
setpoint of particular concern for a DER is its local droop curve setpoint. In the
next chapter we develop a detection and mitigation strategy for this attack on
communication link, as opposed to an local attack on the DER controller.
Relevant Vulnerabilities:
• A copy of a prior command is difficult to distinguish from a new legitimate
command in the communication protocol
• Unnecessary access is permitted to the communications channel for remote
communications
• Physical access may be obtained by unauthorized individuals
Impact:
• The DER system may sustain damage due to trying to act on invalid mes-
sages
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• The MG may experience frequency instability
• Underutilization of DER’s power output capability during an islanding sce-
nario
Potential Mitigations:
• Check message integrity in communication protocols used to manage DER
information exchange
• Protect against replay in communication protocols used to manage DER
information exchange
• Create audit log of droop curve settings data
3.5.2 Scenario 2: Malicious Injection of False Measurement in
Process Bus
Description: An adversary has gained access to the process bus and can monitor
the traffic and then commence reporting incorrect measurement from a spoofed
merging unit.
Relevant Vulnerabilities:
• A copy of a prior message is difficult to distinguish from a new legitimate
message in the communication protocol
• Unnecessary access is permitted to the communications channel for remote
communications
• Physical access may be obtained by unauthorized individuals
Impact:
• Possible loss of customer due to tripping of protective relays
• Possible loss of customer due to tripping of DERs




• Check message integrity in communication protocols used to transmit digi-
tal measurements
• Protect against replay in communication protocols used to transmit digital
measurements
3.5.3 Scenario 3: Denial-of-Service Attack on the Station Bus
Description: Malware installed on the DER controller may flood the ethernet bus
with GOOSE messages. Additionally, if the malware is introduced into multiple
DER controllers (perhaps done at a manufacturing site of a vendor), there could
be multiple DER controllers flooding the network, effectively deploying a DoS
attack.
Relevant Vulnerabilities:
• Unnecessary access is permitted to the communications channel for remote
communications
• Network interfaces permit unnecessary traffic flows to communication net-
works
Impact:
• DER control signals are not sent and the system may deviate from nominal
frequency
• The MG DERs may not know if an islanding scenario has happened and so
do not switch to the correct control mode, causing a voltage collapse
Potential Mitigations:
• Restrict network service access
• Require intrusion detection and prevention
• Authenticate devices accessing the station bus
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3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided an explicit characterization of the MG control system using
an ontology developed in this thesis. The ontology details the components of
the system, the attributes of those components, and the relationships between the
components. This ontology was then used to build an ADVISE model to generate
attack execution graphs. Pertinent threat scenarios were then presented in terms





This chapter will introduce the control algorithm used for decentralized secondary
control for MGs. Decentralized secondary control has computational benefits, and
allows for cyber attack detection. A detection algorithm is developed to determine
where malicious attacks are occurring, namely on the measurements, DER con-
troller, or the communication link. A mitigation strategy is given to keep the MG
at nominal frequency and voltage. The methods developed in this chapter can then
be incorporated into a hierarchical MG control system.
We formulate the secondary frequency control under steady state as a consen-
sus optimization problem, as in [30]. To avoid a single point of failure and en-
hance DERs’ plug-and-play capability, we propose to solve this problem in a de-
centralized fashion by adopting the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
(ADMM) algorithm [42]. The ADMM is a splitting optimization technique that
has been widely used in a variety of scientific disciplines such as signal process-
ing, statistical learning, and more recently, power system operations [43]. Based
on this algorithm, a DER controller uses local sensor measurements of voltage
and current to perform a simple algorithmic computation for generating a local
estimate. This estimate is then communicated to a central supervisor (e.g., MGC),
which computes the average consensus of all estimates and broadcasts this con-
sensus variable back to each DER controller. Our implementation differs from
that of most decentralized frequency control designs [25, 44–47] in that we advo-
cate modifying the ADMM updates originally derived for the steady state objec-
tive to an online feedback-based scheme, incorporating the instantaneous power
measurements. Interestingly, it turns out that we do not need to explicitly model
the MG power flow as the instantaneous power feedback signal couples DERs
with power system networks. The proposed control design has been extensively
validated using a realistic MG, and its performance can be guaranteed in terms of
achieving zero frequency deviation with proportional power sharing among DERs.
While the cyber infrastructure enables the proposed decentralized control de-
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sign, there is growing concern that it also exposes an attack surface for cyber
adversaries. This is not hypothetical, as evidenced by recent cyber-induced out-
ages in the Ukraine power system [48]. Hence, our control framework requires
cyber defenses for controls and DERs against potential malicious cyber attacks.
We consider an adversary model whereby an adversary can inject syntactically
correct but destabilizing spoofed measurements and control commands, causing
the secondary frequency control to fail and possibly resulting in an outage. The
utilization of syntactically correct control commands during an attack to cause
power outages has recently been reported [49], which motivates this work as ad-
dressing realistic attack scenarios.
4.1 System Modeling and Problem Statement
The islanded MG consists of m buses, where the buses in N := {1, · · ·n} are
DER buses and the rest are in the subset of load buses NL := {n+ 1, · · ·m}. Per
bus-i, we represent the complex voltage and its phase angle as vi and θi, respec-
tively. The active power injection of DER-i is denoted by Pi while P ∗i corresponds
to its active power rating. Additionally, ωi := (θ̇i − ωb) is the frequency devia-
tion with θ̇i := dθi/dt and ωb representing the frequency and nominal frequency
set-point, respectively. To facilitate the ensuing control design, we introduce the
following assumptions that are commonly used in the MG literature [26, 30, 50].
(A1) The power lines are relatively short and thus lossless.
(A2) The voltage magnitude |vi| at each bus is regulated to stay constant.
(A3) All possible load variations can be fully supported by the DERs without
violating their active power rating limits.
(A4) The load stays constant while executing the proposed frequency control.
The short distance property in (A1) typically holds for power lines in MGs. Hence,
line losses are negligible compared to line flows. Through the fast inner control
loops along with the voltage-droop control design, DERs’ reactive power output
is used to track a reference voltage level, at a much faster time-scale than that of
the frequency control. This time-scale separation between frequency and voltage
dynamics is well supported by earlier work on MG modeling [51]. Accordingly,
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this leads to (A2) where the voltage magnitude at all nodes can be assumed to
be fixed (see, e.g., [20, 26, 50]). Additionally, (A3) can be guaranteed through
a careful system planning at the MG deployment stage; see e.g., [52, Remark
1]. Last, under a load disturbance, the proposed frequency control design is fast
enough to restore the system frequency to its nominal value before another load
change occurs. Thus, (A4) holds.
The goal of a secondary frequency control is to 1) ensure a steady state zero
frequency deviation (i.e., ωi = 0,∀i) and 2) guarantee autonomous active power






= · · · Pn
P ∗n
.
To this end, the active power-frequency (P -ω) droop control is adopted to achieve
these objectives [53]. Figure 4.1 depicts the droop characteristics which mimic the




i − Pi − pi (4.1)
where the droop coefficient Di is determined by the rating of DER-i. Herein we
set a uniform Di/P ∗i among all DERs. Compared to conventional P -ω droop
control, an additional control input pi is introduced in (4.1). Since P ∗i and Di
are fixed parameters, the operating set-point of DER-i can only be changed by
judiciously controlling pi.










Figure 4.1: Frequency droop characteristics with proposed secondary control
design.
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, ∀i, j ∈ N
(4.2)
where D := diag(D1, ...Dn) is an n×n diagonal matrix and the weighted norm
‖v‖2D := vTDv for any vector v. Under steady state and (A3), the objective of
(4.2) turns out to be zero, corresponding to achieving a zero system frequency
deviation. In addition, due to a uniform Di/P ∗i , the equality constraints in (4.2)
equivalently enforce a proportional active power sharing. Note that the quadratic
program (4.2) could be solved using off-the-shelf convex solvers. Nonetheless, the
challenge lies in that the active power injection P is dynamical and coupled to the
power system network. To tackle this problem, we adopt the feedback approach
from [30] to account for system dynamics. We refer the reader to that source
for detailed derivations. To sum up, under (A1)-(A4), the optimizer of (4.2) can
effectively archive the aforementioned goal of secondary frequency regulation.
4.2 ADMM-based Decentralized Solver
This section introduces our proposed ADMM-based decentralized secondary con-
trol design. The dynamics coupling P and p are neglected initially. As detailed
below, the feedback approach will be introduced to account for such interactions.
Hence, the objective in (4.2) is fully separable. Using the IEC 61850 communica-
tion protocol for measurement and control messages, we can solve the consensus
optimization problem (4.2) in a fully decentralized fashion. For notational con-
venience, we let the optimization variable xi := pi/Di and the input variable
ci := (P
∗
i − Pi)/Di where Pi is the active power injection from DER-i and lo-






subject to x = z1 (4.3b)
where z is a consensus value among the DERs. Note that the equality constraints
in (4.2) are equivalent to (4.3b) under a connected communication network. Defin-
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ing the multipliers λ and a constant ρ > 0, we introduce the augmented La-
grangian function as L =
∑
∀i∈N Li(xi, z, λi) where
Li(xi, z, λi) =
Di
2
(ci − xi)2 + λi(xi − z) +
ρ
2
(xi − z)2. (4.4)
Based on the (4.4), the ADMM algorithm is invoked and its (k + 1)-st iteration
for DIC-i has the following three steps [42]:
(S1) Update x: As L totally decouples into Li for each DER-i, minimizing xi
involves only the variables zk and λki . Thus, upon receiving z
k from the
MGC, the update is
xk+1i := arg min
xi
Li(xi, zk, λki ). (4.5)







where cki is the feedback measurement signal, corresponding to the active
power injection of DER-i.
(S2) Update z: Likewise, the consensus variable is updated as
zk+1 := arg min
z
L(xk+1, z,λk).




i is guaranteed to stay








(S3) Update λ: Each multiplier is linearly updated by the iterative mismatch of





i − zk+1). (4.8)
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(xti − zt) = 0.
This fact corroborates the derivation in (4.7).
4.3 Detection and Localization Strategies
Under an IEC 61850 communication framework, we assume that attackers have
compromised the local DER controllers such that the local variable x is altered,






i is the bias appended to x
k+1
i at the DER-i.






















being the average attack bias signal with time-varying
and arbitrary magnitude. Under the presence of this attack, the consensus vari-
able zk+1 would diverge unless ∆k+1 is designed specifically so the effect on the
consensus variable is trivial. This is, however, unlikely to happen as the attacker
does not have the full system information. In any case, such an attack bias signal
may drive the MG to unstable conditions and/or damage system equipment, e.g.,
causing divergence of zk+1.
It is imperative to detect and localize the malicious attack signals promptly
since the control design is based on zk+1. To this end, we monitor the evolution of
zk+1 and design a flag to trigger the ensuing detection algorithm. Assuming the
convergence of zk+1, we would trigger the detection algorithm once the following
condition has been satisfied:
|zk+1 − zk| > ε
where ε > 0 is a pre-defined threshold.
43
4.3.1 Round-Robin-Based ADMM Detection Algorithm
The RR-ADMM detection algorithm to discover the malicious DERs is adapted
from [33]. The RR is an arrangement of selecting the DER in a fixed order, i.e.,
DER-1 to DER-n. For notational convenience, we denote the consensus variable
for the RR-ADMM at iteration k as z̃k. Given α > 0, the steps (S1)-(S3) become






λk+1 = λk + ρ(xk+1 − z̃k+11) (4.10c)
where I is the identity matrix with ĩ = 1, · · · , n representing the fixed Round-
Robin iteration index. For a non-malicious DER, we set δk+1
ĩ
= 0. Hence, we


























Let z̃r := {z̃r,1, · · · , z̃r,n} ∈ Rn gather all the values of the consensus variable
at the r-th round of the RR-ADMM algorithm. To determine a threshold to sep-
arate malicious DER controllers from the rest of the system, we assume that the
bias δk+1
ĩ
is sufficiently large. Based on (4.12), one of the values from the non-
malicious DERs during the r-th round must be z̃r,ñ with the index ñ corresponding
to the smallest element of z̃r. Given this index, the (r + 1)-st round is carried out
for obtaining the value of z̃r+1,ñ where ñ is the same index in round r as in round
1, and this serves as the detection threshold. Hence, any z̃r,̃i > z̃r+1,ñ, ∀ĩ ∈ N \ ñ
is identified as the malicious DER in the MG. For a given initialization time index
k?, Algorithm 1 tabulates the detection strategy. As for the localization strategy
to isolate the aforementioned malicious attack signals, the MGC first reconfig-
ures the communication network so the malicious DERs no longer participate the
ADMM updates in (S1)-(S3) and thus switch to only local droop (primary) control
mode. Meanwhile, if zero frequency deviation is achieved, we conclude the isola-
tion process. Otherwise, the malicious DERs are tripped off-line because of either
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Algorithm 1 Detection and Localization Strategies
1: for every iteration k = 0, 1, 2, · · · do
2: for i ∈ N do
3: Compute xk+1i as in (4.6) and send it to MGC
4: end for
5: MGC computes zk+1 as in (4.7)
6: if |(zk+1 − zk| > ε) ∧ (k > k?) then
7: if r = 1 then
8: MGC computes z̃k+1 as in (4.10b)
9: Broadcast the value of z̃k+1 to all DERs
10: Determine the index ñ for the minimum entry of z̃1
11: end if
12: if (r = 2) ∧ (k ≤ k? + n+ ñ) then
13: MGC computes z̃k+1 as in (4.10b)
14: Broadcast the value of z̃k+1 to all DERs
15: Identify malicious DER-̃i where {̃i | z̃1,̃i > z̃2,ñ,∀ĩ ∈ N \ ñ}
16: MGC reconfigures the communication network, resets λk = 0,
and/or trip malicious DERs off-line
17: end if
18: else
19: Broadcast the value of zk+1 to all DERs
20: end if
21: for i ∈ N do
22: Compute λk+1i as in (4.8)
23: end for
24: end for
measurement or control signal attack. Last, note that there must be at least one
non-malicious DER in the system for the RR-ADMM detection scheme to work.
This detection strategy can detect n−1 malicious DERs in a microgrid. However,
this scheme is only for detection purposes. Thus, once the malicious attacks are
localized, the control design is reverted back to follow the ADMM algorithm in
(S1)-(S3).
4.3.2 Measurement Attack Detection
We now describe a defense against false measurement injection to complement
defenses against control attacks given above. We adopt the Agreement Algorithm
(AA), which was developed in [34], to determine and locate malicious measure-
ment attacks on substation IEDs and controllers. Accordingly, under constant
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impedance loads, the Kirchhoff’s voltage and current laws along with Ohm’s law
are used to facilitate the development of agreement matrix A. Figure 4.2 show-
cases the reference MG topology with corresponding measurement locations. The
polarity of the complex current fi measured at merging unit-i is positive when cur-
rent flows into the loads and DERs. By concatenating both complex current and
voltage vectors as x = (f ,v), the physical laws assert
Ax = 0. (4.13)
Considering that (4.13) is similar to the error correcting code formulation from
[34], if an attacker falsifies one of the measurements, we would have a non-zero
corresponding element of the resultant vector, known as the Syndrome vector.
By injecting the malicious vectors ∆f and ∆v to the measurements, we have
x̄ = (f + ∆f ,v + ∆v). Thus, the Syndrome vector is
s = Ax̄. (4.14)
By observing the pattern of vector s, we can classify multiple subsets of potential
malicious merging units. Accordingly, the largest magnitude element of a subset
corresponds to the malicious location. This detection mechanism is valid for a
limited number of attacks. We refer the reader to [54] for a detailed discussion.
Figure 4.2: Reference MG communication architecure and data types.
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4.4 Numerical Tests
In this section, we investigate the performance of the decentralized secondary
frequency control in response to a load disturbance. In addition, we evaluate the
proposed mitigation strategies and responses for the communication and measure-
ment link attack scenarios . All numerical tests are performed in Mathworks®
MATLAB 2013a and Simulink software.
The three-phase MG topology and power system parameters are given in Figure
4.3 and Table 4.1, respectively, while Figure 4.4 depicts the MG control system
communication network topology. To reiterate, the measurements are sent to the
local DERs from a merging unit (which we omit from the figure), and the DERs
and MGC communicate updates for the ADMM algorithm. This is done over
switched Ethernet, denoted by the Ethernet bus in Figure 4.4.
4.4.1 Load Perturbations
In this scenario, we increase the system load by 100% at t = 4s. Each DER is
rated at P ∗i = 1500 W, ∀i, and we let Di = 2e-5, ∀i to satisfy the active power
sharing. The ADMM algorithm is executed every 100 ms. The resulting bus
frequencies and active power output are shown in Figure 4.5. Within approxi-
mately 1.5 seconds, the secondary frequency control is able to obtain zero system
frequency deviation from nominal, and the DERs have correctly achieved equal
power sharing.
Table 4.1: Line impedances
Line Impedance
Z1 0.20256 + j0.7548
Z2 0.20256 + j0.7548
Z3 0.00276 + j0.0158
Z4 0.00276 + j0.0158
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Figure 4.3: Islanded MG topology and line parameter locations.
Figure 4.4: Reference MG communication architecure and data types.
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Figure 4.5: Frequency and active power output response to a load disturbance.
4.4.2 Local Attack on DER Controller
We generate an attack signal as a time-varying random number from a uniform
(0,3) distribution and drawing a new random value at a time step of 100 ms. We
multiply this by the steady state xi value at the attack location, so that the attack
is effectively a random re-scaling of this value.
We generate an attack signal as a time-varying random number from a uniform
(0,3) distribution and drawing a new random value at a time step of 100 ms. We
multiply this by the steady state xi value at the attack location, so that the attack
is effectively a random re-scaling of this value. The attack is introduced at t =
4.1 s on the local xi issued to DER-3. The resulting system response and RR-
ADMM attack detection and mitigation algorithm results are shown in Figure 4.6.
From the plot of the local xi’s, it can be seen that this particular attack introduced a
signal that is approximately 275% of the steady state x3 signal. Clearly the system
diverges away from its steady state while the attack is present. At t = 5.4 s, the
RR-ADMM successfully detected DER-3 as malicious and tripped it off-line. The
detection threshold, ε, was set at 10%. For t > 5.5 s, we see the ADMM algorithm
change to only include DER-1 and DER-2, and in doing so it achieves zero system
frequency deviation.
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Figure 4.6: Frequency, active power output, and local xi update responses to a
local controller attack in steady state operation.
We also investigated what would happen if an attack occurred during a load
disturbance. While a coincidental simultaneous occurrence of these two events
may seem unlikely, we are motivated to seek solutions to coordinated attacks,
i.e., the attacker causes a load disruption and alters the local controller updates.
The results of this are presented in Figure 4.7. At t = 4 s, we introduce a load
disturbance of 25% and then subsequently cause an attack at t = 4.1 s on the xi
update to DER-3, similar to the attack scenario in the steady state case. We see
that the attack signal was approximately 200% of the transient x3 signal. The RR-
ADMM was still able to identify the malicious DER even in the presence of a load
disturbance, and after reconfiguring the ADMM algorithm at t = 5.5 s, the system
achieves zero frequency deviation.
4.4.3 Communication Link Attack on Control Command
In this attack we consider that an attacker has gained access to the station bus,
the Ethernet bus that is exchanging control commands between the local DER
controllers and the MGC. The attacker is able to spoof the MAC address of a DER
controller and thus can alter control commands over the link. This is contrasted
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Figure 4.7: Frequency, active power output, and local xi update responses to a
local controller attack during a load disturbance.
with the previous attack since it is not on the local DER controller, and thus the
time-varying attack signal does not directly affect the power injection command
to the DER. The attack detection monitors the consensus variable and raises a flag
when a deviation occurs that exceeds a threshold. In our simulation we again use
a 10% deviation as the threshold. As the consensus variable is the average across
n DERs, an attack bias may not be large, so that is the motivation for setting a
relatively sensitive threshold. After the flag is raised, the RR-ADMM is executed
to determine which DER is malicious. The MGC then reconfigures the ADMM
update to only include the non-malicious DERs, while issuing a configuration
command to the spoofed DER to revert to local frequency droop control, and not
participate in secondary control. The spoofed DER should then eventually return
to its initial power setpoint while the non-malicious DERs continue to regulate the
system frequency to achieve zero frequency deviation.
Figure 4.8 shows the results of this attack simulation. At t = 4.1 s an attack
signal is introduced on the x3 update sent from DER-3 controller to the MGC.
The attack signal is the same as generated in the previous section. The MGC then
runs the detection mechanism from the RR-ADMM to find the malicious DER.
At t = 5.3 s the MGC has determined that DER-3 is malicious and removes it
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Figure 4.8: Frequency, active power output, and local xi update responses to an
communication link attack on a control command.
from the ADMM update and sets it to local frequency control. As a reminder,
the x3 update is a function of p3, which is the power injection offset to the droop
curve. By setting x3 to zero, the DER controller turns to local droop control. After
reconfiguring the frequency control, the DER-1 and DER-2 continue to execute
the secondary frequency control while maintaining power sharing between DER-1
and DER-2 and zero system frequeny deviation.
4.4.4 Attack on Measurement
In this attack scenario the attacker either manipulates measurements locally at a
merging unit, or could be spoofing erroneous measurements on a compromised
communication link. We introduce at attack on the current f6 at t = 2 s. Immedi-
ately after, the AA calculates that the syndrome vector magnitudes have exceeded
a threshold of 2. In steady state, the syndrome vector output is near zero and we
use 2 as a noise threshold. Figure 4.9 shows the attack simulation results. When
the threshold is exceeded, the AA determines the largest syndrome vector, and this
corresponds to the location of the measurement attack. In this case, it successfully
determines the attacked measurement.
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Figure 4.9: Syndrome vector outputs during a measurement attack.
Proper mitigation of this attack scenario would depend upon the location of the
attacked, or spoofed, measurements. If the attacked measurement is the input to a
DER controller, then the DER will need to be isolated physically so that it cannot
destabilize the MG. If the attacked measurement is an input to a protective relay,
a blocking signal should be sent to the relay to keep it from erroneously tripping,
which would result in a loss of load. A distributed state estimator could be used
to determine what the actual current is, and this could be sent to the relay.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a decentralized secondary frequency control that
can successfully achieve frequency regulation in islanded ac MGs. This approach
is based on formulating the DER droop characteristic equations as a consensus op-
timization problem with a power injection offset command as the control variable.
This quadratic program is solved with an ADMM-based decentralized algorithm.
DER controllers locally calculate their power injection value and then commu-
nicate this with the central controller. The central controller then calculates the
consensus of all DERs and broadcasts this value. This decentralized approach
allows for cyber attack detection mechanisms on local controller and communi-
cation link attacks. The proposed detection algorithm is based on a Round-Robin
ADMM algorithm which sequentially updates the consensus variable as a func-
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tion of local controller updates, and the largest magnitude entries determine which
DER is malicious. We pair this with a complementary false data injection de-
tection mechanism called an agreement algorithm. Mitigation strategies such as
cutting attackers off from the control algorithm or tripping a compromised DER
off-line entirely are discussed. Together these algorithms can implement a re-
silient closed-loop control architecture. Finally, we demonstrated the efficacy of




Motivated by the increasing penetration of DERs and smart grid technologies and
the possibilities they offer, this thesis details a MG threat model and explores a re-
silient frequency control approach. We begin by building an ontology for the MG,
consisting of components, attributes of the components, and relationships between
those components. We then use this ontology to build an ADVISE model of the
reference MG topology. This model outputs attack execution graphs that formally
express the potential attack paths of an adversary attack the system. The threat
modeling is then concluded with representative threat scenarios being expanded
upon to include relevant vulnerabilities, impacts, and potential mitigations.
We then formulated a decentralized secondary frequency control algorithm.
The decentralized architecture is based upon the communication standard used
herein. The secondary frequency control under steady state is formulated as a
consensus optimization problem and is solved in a decentralized fashion using the
ADMM algorithm. This allows for computation to be done locally at DER con-
trollers and then communicating the consensus variable with the central MGC.
This enables a plug-and-play capability since the central MGC does not need ex-
tensive computation capabilities, and the local computation is fast. The algorithm
was verified with simulations consisting of step load changes for a small MG
topology.
To mitigate some of the attack vectors discussed in the threat modeling, we
developed a detection mechanism that updates the consensus variable in a round-
robin fashion based on the ADMM algorithm. When the consensus variable starts
to diverge, this RR-ADMM is used to detect the malicious DER(s). The central
MGC then reconfigures the control updates to not include the malicious DER(s).
If after a certain period the frequency does not converge to nominal steady-state,
the central MGC will then physically trip off the DER. We concluded with a vali-
dation of the detection and mitigation strategy via simulations.
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5.1 Future Work
As part of our future work, we plan to build a hardware-in-the-loop testbed to
demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed algorithms. We would like to use Bea-
gleBone Black microcontrollers for the DER controllers and central MGC. Hard-
ware relays will be integrated with an RTDS that is solving the power system
dynamical equations. We plan to use an open-source library for the IEC 61850
communication standard.
An extension of this work would be determining the optimal penetration of dis-
patchable DERs required to enable proper frequency regulation. Energy storage
remains more costly relative to non-dispatchable resources, and economic assess-
ment of the benefits provided for frequency regulation could shed light on pricing
mechanisms to incentivize adoption of dispatchable DERs.
Another extension of this work is when to reintegrate malicious DERs that were
cut off during operation. An open question remains if this should be done auto-
matically or manually. The ability to create an automatic re-integration strategy is
a question of interest.
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